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Abstract
This article argues that post-conflict consociational arrangements in ethnically divided
societies incentivize moderation by political parties, but not policy differentiation outside
the main conflict. This results in little policy-driven voting. Analysing party manifestos
and voter survey data, we examine the evolution of party policy and cleavage voting
under power-sharing in Northern Ireland 1998–2016. We find a reduction in ethno-
national policy differences between parties and that ethno-nationalism has become less
important in predicting vote choice for Protestants, but not Catholics. We also find little
party differentiation in other policy areas and show that vote choices are largely independ-
ent of people’s policy stances on economic or social issues. Our findings are thus largely
consistent with a ‘top-down’ interpretation of political dynamics.
Keywords: voting; power-sharing; consociation; ideology; parties; Northern Ireland
The Northern Ireland Assembly and power-sharing executive have now been in
place, albeit not in continuous operation, for over 20 years. In the early years of
power-sharing opinion was divided as to how the new consociational institutions
would shape party politics and voter behaviour. Some argued that the new rules
of the game would almost inevitably lead to increased ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Dixon
2002; Taylor 2001; Wilford 2001). This perspective emphasized that consociational
power-sharing would incentivize party competition within the unionist and nation-
alist blocs, with competition focused on the underlying ethno-national dimension.
This dynamic would polarize the parties and, ultimately, voters. Consociational
power-sharing was thus a recipe for political instability.
Others argued that the proportional electoral system used in Assembly elections
and the incentivized collaboration of parties in government would lead to a mod-
eration of party positions on the main ethno-national dimension and potentially
more competition among parties on other issues (McGarry and O’Leary 2004,
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2009; O’Leary 1999, 2001). The consociational institutions would do what they
were meant to do: facilitate elite cooperation within blocs and between blocs.
This cooperation would then lead to policy moderation by parties within the two
opposing blocs on the dominant ethno-national dimension and allow the emer-
gence of competition within blocs on economic and social policy. Put together,
consociationalism promised a more stable future with parties working together
and more ‘bread and butter’ politics within each bloc, even if the two communities
remained distinct.
Which of these perspectives proved more accurate? And how does the example
of Northern Ireland help us to understand, more generally, the effect of consoci-
ational institutions on political competition? We are not the first to try and answer
these questions. Yet much of the previous work on party competition and electoral
behaviour under power-sharing in Northern Ireland examines the years immedi-
ately after the institutions came into play, especially the first two elections, in
1998 and 2003 (Mitchell and Tilley 2004; Mitchell et al. 2001, 2009; Tilley et al.
2008). Although clearly valuable in documenting the transition to power-sharing,
data from this early period tell us little about the long-term effect of those institu-
tions on parties and voters. Moreover, these articles, and subsequent research that
covers later elections (Garry 2016; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty 2008; McGlynn
et al. 2014; Moore et al. 2014), have not systematically measured party positions.
Equally, voter behaviour has not been analysed on a range of policy areas.
This article rectifies all three of these deficiencies. We examine voters and parties
over the long term from 1998 until 2016, we systematically measure party positions
using manifesto data, and we look at the full range of policy areas for both parties
and voters. The combination of voter data and party data enables us to examine
fully the links between party policy and voter behaviour. This comprehensive
assessment of how parties and vote choice have evolved in Northern Ireland
helps us to understand the impact of power-sharing on party competition and
electoral behaviour. Our findings reveal that the consociational optimists were
largely, but not wholly, right. Party competition on the ethno-national policy
dimension within the unionist bloc (between the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)) has decreased substantially. As a con-
sequence of this, voters for the two main unionist parties look much more similar
in terms of their ethno-national ideology. Within the nationalist bloc, party posi-
tions have converged somewhat, but voter choice remains largely centred on ethno-
nationalism. Nonetheless, there has been no increase in polarization between the
two nationalist parties, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP). In that sense, consociation does not appear to have polarized parties
and voter choices, and for unionists it has done the exact opposite. Yet we also
find little evidence that parties are competing for votes on other dimensions either
in terms of their positions or voters’ choices. This is consistent with work that
argues that power-sharing encourages valence politics within blocs: competition
focused on who can deliver for their community (Mitchell et al. 2009).
The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the competing theoretical
accounts of the impact of power-sharing in Northern Ireland on party strategy
and voter choice. Second, we describe our data on party positions drawn from a
bespoke analysis of party manifestos between 1998 and 2016 and from survey
2 James Tilley et al.
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data on voter positions and vote choices in 1998 and 2016. Third, we show how
parties have altered their positions over time and report on a series of models
that use the ideological positions of voters to predict vote choice. Finally, we con-
clude by discussing the implications of our results for consociational theory, top-
down models of voter behaviour and the future of Northern Irish politics.
The consequences of consociation
The ethnic outbidding interpretation of party competition in deeply divided pol-
ities predicts that parties adopt ever more extreme policy positions and generate
a polarized and unstable party system (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle
1972). Fully mobilized ethnic party systems are made up of parties that appeal to
one ethnic group and elections that resemble an ethnic headcount. Within each
ethnic bloc, party competition takes the form of parties seeking to ‘outbid’ each
other with ever more hard-line policy stances on the dominant ethnic dimension.
Voters respond to these platforms. Their choice between parties within their bloc is
based on the strength of their ethnic identity; and attitudes towards economic or
social policy are largely irrelevant.
As Christina Zuber (2012, see also Chandra 2005 and Coakley 2008) points out,
outbidding requires a highly segmented party system and a distribution of voters on
the main dimension which is closer to polarized than normal. This portrait broadly
matches the historical situation in Northern Ireland, and some party changes in the
20th century look like successful cases of outbidding. For example, John Coakley
(2008) and Paul Mitchell (1995) argue that the changing pattern of party support
from the 1970s onwards shows the reality of ethnic outbidding (albeit affected by
the relevant electoral system). Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister also point to
the ‘almost complete replacement of the Irish Parliamentary Party by Sinn Féin
in 1918, and the Nationalist Party by the SDLP in 1970’ as examples of the ‘cyclical
nature of the process and how rapid the turnover can be’ (Hayes and McAllister
2013: 142). Nonetheless there is also long-standing evidence for cross-cutting cleav-
ages within the two blocs, particularly for unionists, which suggests that policy
preferences outside the ethno-national arena may also be important. For example,
Geoffrey Evans and Mary Duffy (1997) showed that there was an economic left–
right cleavage for unionist voters in the 1980s and 1990s, and Tilley et al. (2008)
find a weaker echo of that for nationalists. Linked to this qualification on bloc soli-
darity is the influence of social class on voting: both the UUP and SDLP are typ-
ically found to have a more middle-class voter base (Evans and Tonge 2009;
Hayes and McAllister 2013; McAllister 1983). Equally, there is tentative evidence
that party support in the past was driven by people’s views on ‘moral’ issues
such as abortion rights and same-sex marriage (Mitchell and Tilley 2004).
How did the implementation of the 1998 Agreement affect party policy positions
and voter decision-making? The 1998 Agreement is, almost without exception,
accepted as a consociational settlement (Horowitz 2001; McGarry and O’Leary
2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2009; O’Leary 2001). It established a legislature elected using
the single transferable vote electoral system in conjunction with a sequential divisor
portfolio allocation mechanism (d’Hondt) to generate an inclusive large coalition
government (O’Leary et al. 2005). The agreement explicitly recognized the two
Government and Opposition 3
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principal communities in Northern Ireland: unionists and nationalists. Elected
Members of the Assembly (MLAs) identify as nationalist, unionist or other.
Some legislation requires a concurrent majority among nationalists and unionists
for passage, and a trigger procedure can be invoked by a minority of MLAs to oblige
normal decision-making to be passed with cross-community consent.
Many argued in the early days of power-sharing in Northern Ireland that polit-
ical polarization would increase (Dixon 2002; Oberschall and Palmer 2005; O’Flynn
2003; Taylor 2001, 2006; Wilford 2001). This was partly because consociation was
expected to entrench and reinforce existing divisions, but it was also a prediction
about future party strategy. Since the two major blocs are institutionalized, the
arrangements benefit the party most strongly associated with each ethnic bloc:
the most extreme party. Moreover, the extreme parties are incentivized to increase
the salience of the ethno-national dimension, forcing other parties to compete on
that dimension. This means that voters pay less attention to other policy areas and
there is uni-dimensional party competition on the ethno-national cleavage within
blocs.
Others, however, saw consociation as a route to moderation, arguing that the
form of consociation in Northern Ireland undermines the rationale for outbidding
(McGarry and O’Leary 2004, 2009; O’Leary 1999, 2001; for a recent update see
McCrudden et al. 2016). Power-sharing in Northern Ireland creates strong incen-
tives for parties to take their proportional share of ministerial portfolios, which
means that radicals are not outside the tent ‘creating a polarized atmosphere that
pressurizes moderates and makes compromise difficult’ (McGarry and O’Leary
2009: 599). Rather, radical parties expand their support at the expense of moderate
parties, while at the same time becoming more like the moderate parties they
replace (McGarry and O’Leary 2004; Mitchell et al. 2001).
Moreover, the institutional set-up can be seen as erecting barriers to new parties
which challenge the status quo using an outbidding strategy, while also allowing
new cleavages between existing parties to emerge. As John McGarry and
Brendan O’Leary (2004: 344) argued a few years after the Good Friday
Agreement: ‘If Northern Ireland’s Agreement can be consolidated, there is a
much greater likelihood of debate on socio-economic and related issues than existed
in the political vacuum that preceded devolution.’ Party competition within blocs
may move away from just the ethno-national dimension. Mitchell et al. (2009)
develop this idea by arguing that these incentives for moderation lead to ‘ethnic
tribune’ parties. Parties within a bloc do not compete on new economic or social
policy positions, but rather as champions of their community in the cross-
community power-sharing executive. Party policy positions become similar, and
policy distinctions – because they are increasingly minimal – become irrelevant
to voters when they decide their vote.
We are not the first to try and adjudicate between the argument that consoci-
ation leads to polarization and the argument that it leads to moderation. There
were a number of important empirical studies in the immediate aftermath of the
1998 and 2003 Assembly elections (Mitchell et al. 2009; Mitchell and Evans
2009; Tilley et al. 2008) and there has been work looking at some of the more recent
elections as well (Coakley 2008; Garry 2016; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty 2008;
McGlynn et al. 2014; Moore et al. 2014). Yet there is little research which includes
4 James Tilley et al.
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the most recent period of functioning power-sharing: 2011–16. Here we take the
longer view by looking at the entire 1998–2016 period of power-sharing. We are
thus able to assess the long-term effect of institutional change on party and
voter choices. Moreover, there is still disagreement on whether parties and electo-
rates have polarized or moderated, and, if so, when that happened. Indeed, there is
no consensus that these two things have even occurred together. Stephen Farry
(2009) argues that party politics became more polarized after the 1998
Agreement, but that the electorate became more moderate, or at least no more
extreme. Similarly, previous findings on cleavage change at the voter level have
been mixed. For example, while some work has suggested that cross-cutting clea-
vages within blocs disappeared (Tilley et al. 2008), there is also evidence that cross-
cutting cleavages emerged after 1998 (Mitchell and Tilley 2004).
There are two main reasons for these disagreements. One relates to party posi-
tions, the other to voter decisions. Party positions are not easy to measure. Most
authors describe specific policies and stances that parties adopt and how these com-
pare to other specific policies before the Good Friday Agreement (see for example
Moore et al. 2014). This can be illuminating, but by its very nature it provides a
partial, and fragmented, view of the ideological movements of parties. Here we
aim systematically to measure party positions on multiple dimensions of potential
policy conflict over the entire period of the Agreement. The second difficulty relates
to how we look at cleavage politics within the electorate. Much of the existing work
focuses on aggregate statistics of support for extreme positions, but the crucial test
is really whether policy divisions within the electorate are translated into policy-
driven voting. Here we look at multiple potential policy dimensions in models of
vote choice at elections. Thus, we aim to assess fully how party policy, in all its
types, has changed since the advent of the Agreement and how voters’ choices
have, or have not, been shaped by the parties’ movements.
Methods and data
Measuring party positions
There is much debate as to the best way to estimate the policy positions of political
agents. Expert surveys,1 roll-call analysis and voter estimates all have advantages
(Laver 2001). Here we focus on manifesto analysis, which is best for our purposes
since manifestos represent party policy in a comparable manner across parties and
across time. Manifestos are substantive documents: they elaborate the core policy
and programmatic statements of parties. And while few voters actually read
them, they are extensively distributed and commented on by the media (Laver
and Garry 2000).
We use every manifesto of the four major Northern Ireland parties published at
each of the five Assembly elections between 1998 and 2016 to estimate party posi-
tions on three major policy dimensions: ethno-national; economic left–right; and
social liberal–conservative. We also include the 2011 and 2016 manifestos of
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), a small unionist party which emerged from a
2007 split in the DUP. We use a specially constructed coding frame for the
Northern Ireland context which facilitates coding on the underlying ethno-national
Government and Opposition 5
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dimension of policy as well as coding on a range of generic policy dimensions (eco-
nomic, moral, environmental, and so on). The precise coding details are in online
Appendix 1. These manifesto data provide, first, a measure of policy salience: the
proportion of the quasi-sentences in each manifesto that discuss a specific issue.
Second, they give us a measure of policy position, namely, the net score of pro
and anti- sentences.
Measuring voter positions and choices
More straightforward, although by no means trivial, is the measurement of voter
positions and vote choice. The data we use here are high-quality face-to-face sur-
veys carried out in 1998 and 2016 following the Assembly elections. Both surveys
used a mock ballot for the vote question, allowing us to measure vote choices dir-
ectly.2 Both surveys included identical, or very similar, questions that can be scaled
to give measures of underlying values that relate directly to the three dimensions of
party competition already discussed: ethno-nationalism, economic left–right and
social liberalism–conservativism. Full details of these scales are in online
Appendix 2.
Our models predict first preference vote choice at the Assembly election in 1998
and 2016, excluding non-voters and votes for the smallest parties. We separate
Protestants and Catholics as most essentially vote within two different party sys-
tems. Religion is measured with reference to people’s own self-professed religion
and the religion that they were brought up in. Only 5% of people in 2016 were clas-
sified as having no religion along with another 1% that identified as a member of a
non-Christian religion. These numbers were even lower in 1998. For Protestants we
model vote choice between the two main unionist parties, the DUP and UUP, as
well as Alliance, other unionist parties3 (in 1998) and the TUV (in 2016). For
Catholics we model vote choice between the main nationalist parties, Sinn Féin
and the SDLP, as well as Alliance and grouped leftist parties4 (in 2016). We exclude
the extremely small number of Protestants (3% in 2016) who gave their first pref-
erence vote to a nationalist party and the equally small number of Catholics (4% in
2016) who gave their first preference vote to a unionist party.
The models contain a number of social characteristics as control variables. Many
of these might be thought of as precursors to the three ideological positions and
therefore of less interest when we want to assess policy voting. As elsewhere, occu-
pational social class is a strong predictor of people’s left–right position and educa-
tion is a strong predictor of social liberalism (Hayes and McAllister 1995). It is
important to control for these variables, however, as they can also have more direct
effects. For example, some parties are perceived as more working class, perhaps
because of their history, and that might directly attract working-class voters.
Birth cohort also has a powerful direct effect on vote choice in Northern Ireland,
with newer generations more likely to support the DUP and Sinn Féin (Hayes
and McAllister 1999, 2013; Tilley and Evans 2011; Tonge et al. 2011). Since gener-
ation is correlated with social liberalism in Northern Ireland (Evans and Tonge
2016), it is important to hold this constant. We include categorical measures of
educational qualification, occupational social class, birth cohort, gender, church
attendance and church denomination (for Protestants). In general, we find similar
6 James Tilley et al.
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effects of social bases on party support as those found by Hayes and McAllister
(2013), and the inclusion of social characteristics in the models makes little differ-
ence to the effects of people’s ideology on vote choice.
Analysis
The ideological movement of parties
How has party ideology changed? Figure 1 shows the positions of the main four
parties in terms of the central ethno-national dimension. Here we simply show
the percentage of codable sentences in the manifestos that are devoted to either
unionist or nationalist sentiments. There is no need to calculate a ‘net’ score,
because the DUP, UUP and TUV never use nationalist sentences and the SDLP
and Sinn Féin never use unionist sentences.5 Scores far above zero indicate a
high proportion of sentences that are unionist, scores far below zero indicate a
high proportion of sentences that are nationalist. There has clearly been conver-
gence as all parties have reduced discussion of the core ideological divide. This,
Figure 1. Percentage of Sentences in Party Manifestos that Are Unionist or Nationalist
Source: Combined Northern Ireland party manifesto file.
Note: The percentage of sentences for the three unionist parties refers to the proportion of codable sentences that
are unionist; the percentage of sentences for the two nationalist parties refers to the proportion of codable sen-
tences that are nationalist.
Government and Opposition 7
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perhaps surprisingly, is much more evident for the DUP than any other party. In
1998 nearly three-quarters of codable sentences in the DUP manifesto referred to
unionism. By 2016, the same calculation is less than 10%. Moreover, the gap
between the DUP and the UUP fell to zero in 2011 and has remained there
since.6 On the nationalist side, this pattern of convergence is also present, but is
weaker. Sinn Féin and the SDLP were more similar in 1998 than were the DUP
and UUP, and there remains a gap, albeit reduced in size, between the parties
right up to 2016.
The only evidence of ethnic outbidding comes from the emergence of the TUV,
which has positioned itself as a more unionist party than the DUP and UUP. Yet
Figure 2. Ideological Positions of the Unionist Parties
Source: Combined Northern Ireland party manifesto file.
Note: The first two graphs show the percentage of codable DUP and UUP manifesto sentences that are economically
left and right wing, and the net position of the parties. The second two graphs show the percentage of codable DUP
and UUP manifesto sentences that are socially conservative and socially liberal, and the net position of the parties.
8 James Tilley et al.
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this has proved to be a remarkably ineffective strategy in terms of electoral success.
After splitting from the DUP in late 2007, the TUV has participated in three
Assembly elections. In 2011 it received just 2.5% of first preference votes, in
2016 3.4% and in 2017 2.6%. Bidding for votes on the extreme does not appear
to have worked.
Overall, there has been a great deal of change in terms of ethno-national posi-
tioning, especially on the unionist side. But what about party positions on other
more ‘bread and butter’ matters? Figure 2 shows the positions of the DUP and
UUP on the left–right and liberal–conservative dimensions. These graphs show
both salience and position. Take the top left graph for the DUP and left–right ideol-
ogy. The top dotted line shows the number of sentences that are left wing, the bot-
tom dotted line shows the number of sentences that are right wing and the thick
black line shows the net position, which is the number of left-wing sentences
minus the number of right-wing sentences.7 The net position changes remarkably
little over time, but the number of left–right statements increases a great deal. In
1998 less than 10% of the manifesto was devoted to left–right economic issues;
by 2016 over half of the codable sentences in the DUP manifesto were about
left–right issues. The UUP’s net left–right position shown in the top right graph
also remains fairly similar over time, but the salience of these issues changes
much less than for the DUP. The UUP looks a little more left wing than the
DUP since the Agreement, but it is notable how these changes are relatively
small compared with the ethno-national dimension. Both parties also have a fairly
mixed position – neither is producing exclusively left or right policy positions.
The bottom two graphs show the parties’ statements about liberal–conservative
issues.8 While neither party focuses on these issues a great deal, there is a relatively
consistent difference between the two that has grown slightly over time. Whereas
the DUP manifestos almost never contain socially liberal sentences, the UUP pos-
ition has become a little more socially liberal than the DUP over time.
Figure 3 shows the same graphs, but for the two nationalist parties. Both are
clearly more left wing than the two unionist parties. Sinn Féin manifestos rarely
have right-wing sentences, and there are normally more than three or four times
as many left-wing sentences as right-wing sentences in the SDLP manifestos.
There is a gap between the parties, but it is small and changes little. The bottom
two graphs show the liberal–conservative dimension. Neither Sinn Féin nor the
SDLP focus on this very much, but Sinn Féin is slightly more socially liberal
than the SDLP.
In summary, the main change to party positioning has been the enormous con-
vergence between the DUP and UUP in terms of their professed unionism. The
DUP has stopped talking about unionism and started talking about economic
left–right policy, but not in a consistent left or right way. Although there has
also been convergence of the two nationalist parties on the ethno-national dimen-
sion, it is less pronounced than for the unionists. Moreover, while there have been
other small changes in party positions on both sides, the real pattern elsewhere is of
continuity rather than change. Overall, parties have converged on more moderate
ethno-national positions, but at the same time there is little evidence of other policy
dimensions becoming more divisive.
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Vote choice and ideology
The next step of our analysis is to look at how the influence of ideology on vote
choice has changed. Figure 4 shows predicted probabilities from multinomial models
of first preference vote choice in 1998 and 2016 for Protestants.9 The light grey bars
represent people with less unionist views (specifically one standard deviation below
the mean on the unionism scale) and the black bars represent people with more
unionist views (one standard deviation above the mean). As discussed, the models
also include left–right and liberal–conservative ideology as well as a number of social
characteristics.10 The full tables of coefficients for all models discussed here are in
online Appendix 3. If we look at the impact of unionist views on first preference
Figure 3. Ideological Positions of the Nationalist Parties
Source: Combined Northern Ireland party manifesto file.
Note: The first two graphs show the percentage of codable Sinn Féin and SDLP manifesto sentences that are eco-
nomically left and right wing, and the net position of the parties. The second two graphs show the percentage of
codable Sinn Féin and SDLP manifesto sentences that are socially conservative and socially liberal, and the net pos-
ition of the parties.
10 James Tilley et al.
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voting for the two main parties in Figure 4, the degree of change is remarkable. In
1998, people with more unionist views were twice as likely to give a first preference
for the DUP rather than the UUP, and people with less unionist views were more
than twice as likely to give a first preference to the UUP than the DUP. In 2016,
the DUP is more popular generally, but the effect of unionism when comparing
UUP to DUP voters is negligible (and not statistically significant). This fits neatly
with what we saw in terms of the party movements. As the two unionist parties
have converged on the ethno-national dimension, ethno-national policy positions
have become irrelevant for voters deciding between the unionist parties.
No similar convergence is seen among Catholic voters. Figure 5 shows predicted
probabilities of first preference vote choice for Catholics in 1998 and 2016.11 The
light grey bars this time represent people with less nationalist views (specifically
one standard deviation below the mean on the nationalism scale) and the black
bars represent people with more nationalist views (one standard deviation above
the mean). Nationalism is a very strong predictor of first preference vote choice
in both 1998 and 2016. More people give Sinn Féin a first preference in 2016
than did in 1998, but the pattern of voting by nationalist sentiment is similar.
People who are less nationalist give a first preference vote to the SDLP and
Alliance; people who are more nationalist give a first preference vote to Sinn
Féin. This is a little surprising as while the nationalist parties remained distinct
in 2016 that distinctiveness had fallen compared with 1998. We discuss this finding
further in the conclusion.
Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of First Preference Voting of Protestants by Ethno-National Position
Source: 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.
Note: These graphs show predicted probabilities from multinomial logistic regression models of Protestants’ first
preference vote in the 1998 and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. Unionism is measured using three ques-
tions: strength of unionist identity, attitudes towards parades and attitudes towards the IRA. ‘More unionist views’
are scores one standard deviation above the mean and ‘less unionist views’ are scores one standard deviation below
the mean. The models hold constant birth cohort, gender, educational qualifications, occupational social class,
church attendance, denominational affiliation, economic left–right values and social liberal–conservative values.
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Figures 6 and 7 show the effects of people’s placement on the other two ideo-
logical scales on first preference vote choices for Protestants and Catholics respect-
ively. The light grey bars show predicted probabilities for more rightist and more
conservative people (one standard deviation above the mean for each), and the
dark bars predicted probabilities for more leftist and more liberal people (one stand-
ard deviation below the mean for each). Protestants are more likely to give a first
preference vote to the DUP if they are leftist and socially conservative, but these
are relatively small effects (although the differences between the UUP and DUP
are all statistically significant at the 5% level apart from left–right attitudes in
1998). There is also very little change over time. The parties have not really changed
their positions on these secondary dimensions, and neither have voters’ reactions to
the parties. We see something extremely similar on the nationalist side. As Figure 7
shows, the effects of left–right and liberal–conservative attitudes have little effect on
Catholic first preference voting. In fact, none of the coefficients for left–right and lib-
eral–conservative ideology in either 1998 or 2016 is statistically significant at the 5%
level in predicting Sinn Féin, compared with the SDLP, first preference voting.
We thus find little evidence that other cleavages are more prominent in shaping
voter behaviour in 2016 than in 1998. This fits with the party movements. While
parties now focus more on issues that are not ethno-national, they have not adopted
particularly distinctive stances within their blocs. This means that the effects of eco-
nomic left–right and social liberal–conservative ideological positions on people’s
vote choices have largely remained the same.
Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of First Preference Voting of Catholics by Ethno-National Position
Source: 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.
Note: These graphs show predicted probabilities from multinomial logistic regression models of Catholics’ first pref-
erence vote in the 1998 and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. Nationalism is measured using three ques-
tions: strength of nationalist identity, attitudes towards parades and attitudes towards the IRA. ‘More nationalist
views’ are scores one standard deviation above the mean and ‘less nationalist views’ are scores one standard devi-
ation below the mean. The models hold constant birth cohort, gender, educational qualifications, occupational
social class, church attendance, economic left–right values and social liberal–conservative values.
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Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities of First Preference Voting of Protestants by Ideological Position
Source: 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.
Note: These graphs show predicted probabilities from multinomial logistic regression models of Protestants’ first
preference vote in the 1998 and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. The top two graphs show differences
by economic left–right values. These are measured using five questions on state ownership, trade unions, private
enterprise, redistribution and equality. ‘More leftist views’ are scores one standard deviation above the mean and
‘more rightist views’ are scores one standard deviation below the mean. The bottom two graphs show differences
by social liberal–conservative values. These are measured using two questions on abortion rights and homosexual-
ity. ‘More liberal views’ are scores one standard deviation above the mean and ‘more conservative views’ are scores
one standard deviation below the mean. The models hold constant birth cohort, gender, educational qualifications,
occupational social class, church attendance, denominational affiliation, ethno-national position and social liberal–
conservative values (top two graphs) or economic left–right values (bottom two graphs).
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Conclusions
Our findings tell us something about politics in Northern Ireland, but also some-
thing about how parties react to institutional design and how voters react to party
strategy. When people design institutions to address the problem of ethno-national
conflict they clearly envisage that parties will change their behaviour and therefore
Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities of First Preference Voting of Catholics by Ideological Position
Source: 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.
Note: These graphs show predicted probabilities from multinomial logistic regression models of Catholics’ first pref-
erence vote in the 1998 and 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. The top two graphs show differences by eco-
nomic left–right values. These are measured using five questions on state ownership, trade unions, private
enterprise, redistribution and equality. ‘More leftist views’ are scores one standard deviation above the mean and
‘more rightist views’ are scores one standard deviation below the mean. The bottom two graphs show differences
by social liberal–conservative values. These are measured using two questions on abortion rights and homosexual-
ity. ‘More liberal views’ are scores one standard deviation above the mean and ‘more conservative views’ are scores
one standard deviation below the mean. The models hold constant birth cohort, gender, educational qualifications,
occupational social class, church attendance, ethno-national position and social liberal–conservative values (top
two graphs) or economic left–right values (bottom two graphs).
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the choices offered to voters will also change. The consociational institutions of
Northern Ireland have meant that armed conflict has been swapped for portfolios
and veto powers. This appears to have incentivized a reduction in the electoral sali-
ence of the ethno-national divide. There has been intra-bloc party convergence,
although this is more pronounced within the unionist bloc, and these party move-
ments seem to have been picked up by voters. In particular, the absence of policy
division between the UUP and the DUP has led to a situation in which first pref-
erence voters for the two main unionist parties are almost identical in terms of their
ethno-national position. This is important for interpreting Northern Irish politics
and judging the impact of consociation. It suggests that the democratic structures of
consociational power-sharing, perhaps especially those in Northern Ireland, do not
facilitate ethnic outbidding and therefore polarization.
Yet while moderation on the main ethno-national policy dimension is clear, it
has not been replaced by anything else. We see no evidence that peace and power-
sharing have led to the emergence of greater economic or social divisions within,
let alone between, the blocs. O’Leary said in 1995 that ‘when ethno-national com-
munities feel secure, the pressure to sustain solidarity is reduced and the greater the
likelihood that a more pluralist politics can emerge within them … However, one
must not exaggerate these possibilities’ (O’Leary 1995: 713). He was right to add
that disclaimer, as it has not come to pass. Parties may talk more about economic
policy today, but within blocs they do not offer different policy programmes, and
consequently voters do not appear to choose between parties on the basis of eco-
nomic, or social, policy.12
These findings highlight a more general point: the centrality of parties in shap-
ing voter behaviour from the top down. Just as in other democracies, and within the
confines of the more ‘normal’ cleavage politics of class (Evans and Tilley 2017;
Przeworski and Sprague 1986) and religion (Jansen et al. 2013), parties define
the choices offered to voters and hence the active political cleavages within that
society. Nonetheless this top-down model works considerably better for the union-
ist side. Why is there not similar convergence on the nationalist side? It may be the
distinct historical trajectory of Sinn Féin, which emerged as the political arm of the
main paramilitary republican movement, the IRA. The association between con-
temporary Sinn Féin and its violent past means that it has to work especially
hard to persuade voters of its increased policy moderation. This distinction in
the nationalist bloc between a violent (republican) and a constitutional (nationalist)
approach to politics is largely absent in terms of differentiating the two main
unionist parties (see Coakley 2008: 779 and Garry 2016 on asymmetries in the
party system). These historical differences mean that voters may be less willing
to update their views of the nationalist parties.
Leaving aside this asymmetry among voters, do our findings mean that the ethnic
tribune argument (Mitchell et al. 2009) is right? Is it the case that policy positions are
less relevant and people mainly vote for parties that they think best champion their
community interests? The widespread disparities that were previously found between
the parties in perceptions of their ability to defend their own community have cer-
tainly changed. Mitchell et al. (2009) note that large proportions of SDLP and
UUP partisans in 2003 thought that their rival parties within their blocs were better
at standing up for their own side of the ethnic-national divide. This is no longer the
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case. In 2016, only 14% of SDLP first preference voters thought that Sinn Féin was
better at representing Catholics than the SDLP, compared with 4% of Sinn Féin
first preference voters who thought that the SDLP was better at representing
Catholics. Equally, only 11% of UUP first preference voters saw the DUP as better
at representing Protestants, compared with 7% of DUP first preference voters who
thought that the UUP was better at representing Protestants. Yet, this does not refute
the Mitchell et al. (2009) claim as it could be seen as evidence of sorting: previously
UUP voters who used to think the DUP was a better voice for Protestants have
switched their vote to the DUP. Trying to test this argument outside an environment
of rapid change is not easy, however. After all, most of the time people who vote for
party X are unlikely to say that they think X does not defend the interests of their
group. This is clearly an important area for future research, perhaps using experi-
ments that prime identities to untangle the complex causal relationships between
party preferences and perceptions of how parties look after different communities.
Such work would help clarify what particular aspects of the unionist–nationalist dis-
tinction differentiate the parties in voters’ minds.
Finally, we should emphasize that when talking of moderation and convergence,
we are not suggesting that there are no serious policy disagreements between the
hard-line parties from each bloc. Sinn Féin is more socially liberal, more econom-
ically left wing and more nationalist than the DUP. This has destabilized governance
in Northern Ireland since the 2016 Assembly election. Disagreements persist on cru-
cial policy issues, including an Irish Language Act and same-sex marriage, and new
divisions around the Brexit negotiations have emerged since the 2017 general elec-
tion (Tonge and Evans 2018). Regardless of what the future holds for power-sharing
in Northern Ireland, our findings in the 1998–2016 period show that within each
bloc there has been party moderation on the ethno-national dimension, but little
increased division on other dimensions. The pronounced convergence of the two
unionist parties has also meant that unionist voters of both parties look increasingly
similar in terms of their ethno-national policy positions. The more general, and per-
haps more important, lesson is that power-sharing institutions have an effect on
party strategy and that party strategy in turn affects voter behaviour.
Supplementary information. To view the supplementary information for this article, please visit https://
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Notes
1 Examples of expert surveys including Northern Ireland are Benoit and Laver (2006) and the EPAC pro-
ject (Edina and Zuber 2015).
2 With the partial exception of the 2003 Assembly Election Study survey, these are the only two election
study surveys in the 1998–2016 period that facilitate direct comparability across time in terms of measures
of voters on the core ideological attitude dimensions.
3 This group includes voters for the Progressive Unionist Party, the United Kingdom Unionist Party and
the Ulster Democratic Party.
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4 This predominantly means those who voted for People Before Profit, but also people who voted for
Labour (NI) and the Workers’ Party. While these are formally non-aligned parties, they draw almost all
their votes from Catholics.
5 In fact, the SDLP did have one unionist sentence in its 2003 manifesto (out of 564) and four sentences in
its 2007 manifesto (out of 949), and the UUP had one nationalist sentence in its 2007 manifesto (out of
297), but correcting for these exceptions to the rule would make no difference to the patterns shown in
Figure 1.
6 This suggests that the conclusion of Gormley-Heenan and Macginty (2008: 58) that on the unionist side
there was ‘evidence of a trend from outbidding to moderation, but this is best seen as a long and continuing
process rather than an abrupt switch’ now seems a little premature. Nonetheless our data concur with their
central conclusion that ‘the main ethno-national parties have moderated their stances on a range of issues’
(Gormley-Heenan and Macginty 2008: 58).
7 In an attempt to simplify the data, these graphs do not therefore include ‘centrist’ economic sentences
nor ‘general’ economic sentences. In practice, our coding gives very few centrist sentences in any manifesto
and they make up under 1% of all coded sentences. Around 7% of codable manifesto sentences also belong
to a ‘general’ economic category with almost no variation over time or by party.
8 Conservative sentences are those that are morally conservative, authoritarian towards crime and punishment
or anti-immigration. Liberal sentences are the opposite. Again ‘centrist’ and ‘general’ sentences are not shown,
but in total they make up less than 1% of codable sentences for both the nationalist and unionist parties.
9 Unfortunately election surveys between 1998 and 2016 have not systematically carried questions that
allow us to measure the location of voters on the different ideological dimensions. The 2003 election
study is the most complete, but does not have questions that measure the liberal–conservative dimension
and is missing the question on parades used to create ethno-national position. Nonetheless 2003 models
that use a reduced version of the ethno-national measure and exclude the measure of social liberalism sup-
port our general findings. The full 2003 models are in online Appendix 4.
10 The two ideology scales are held at their means (for Protestants) to generate the predicted probabilities.
Social characteristics are mainly held at their modal values.
11 Again the two ideology scales are held at their means (but this time the mean values for Catholics) to
generate the predicted probabilities, and as before social characteristics are generally held at their modal
values.
12 The evolution of the non-aligned parties also tends to support this conclusion. By far the best predictor
of an Alliance vote for both Protestants and Catholics is ethno-national position in both 1998 and 2016.
Perhaps the only evidence for greater pluralism is the 2016 success of People Before Profit which has a dis-
tinctive constituency of economically left-wing Catholics.
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